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‘Die Freundschaft unserer entfernten Vettern’: Feminism and Animal Families in Marlen 
Haushofer’s Die Wand (1963) 
 
Abstract 
This article considers Marlen Haushofer’s novel Die Wand (1963) in the contexts of animal 
(eco)feminism from the 1970s onwards and the animal essays of philosopher Cora Diamond. 
It argues that Haushofer’s novel, in which the female narrator survives behind an invisible 
wall with a ‘family’ of animals, anticipates feminist theories of intersection between the 
oppression of women and of nonhuman animals and illustrates a feminist ethic of care, based 
on a broadly-conceived concept of maternal love. The novel attends to animal characters as 
individuals with agency, and, setting up a stylistic and thematic tension between the everyday 
and the extraordinary, it exposes the reader to difficult ideas that typically resist our modes of 
thought. Despite the novel’s challenge to the conventional way of seeing animals, the narrator 
ultimately concedes that there is a barrier between human beings and other species, but of the 
two she values non-human animals more highly. 
 
 
Austria in the 1950s and 1960s was not an easy place to be a woman or a nonhuman animal. 
Women were largely relegated to the roles of wife and mother, their ‘natural’ capacity for 
caring and nurturing seen as the cornerstone for post-war peace and normality (Vansant 24). 
There were many legal restrictions on women’s freedom, such as a husband’s right to prevent 
his wife from working outside the home (Vansant 26). The women’s liberation movement did 
not begin in Austria until the 1970s (Neyer 92). As far as animals’ wellbeing was concerned, 
two negative developments are evident during this period. Agriculture was rapidly becoming 
more mechanized and the proportion of smaller farms decreased (Mathis 231-32), but there 
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was little legislation to protect animals from cruel factory-farming conditions. Austria first 
ratified the European Convention for the Protection of Animals Kept for Farming Purposes in 
1992 (Wilkins ,‘Animal Welfare’ 404). At the same time, the Austrian animal welfare 
movement, which had begun in 1846 with the foundation in Vienna of a society for the 
protection of animals and had been particularly active around 1900,1 with campaigns for 
vegetarianism and against vivisection, experienced something of a lull.2. Modern animal 
rights activism first began in earnest in Austria in the late 1970s.  
Emerging from this context, Marlen Haushofer’s novel Die Wand (1963, The Wall) is 
extraordinary. It is the first-person account of a woman who wakes up one morning in a 
hunting lodge in the Austrian Alps to find that, nearby, an invisible wall has descended, 
killing the people and animals on the other side. Apparently the only human survivor, the 
narrator develops close, mutually dependent relationships with a dog, a cat, a cow, and their 
offspring. While blaming humanity, and in particular men, for creating a loveless, 
technologically-oriented society responsible for its own demise, she attributes largely positive 
qualities to these animals and loves them like a family. As Dagmar Lorenz points out, 
existence behind the wall after civilization has been destroyed allows Haushofer’s female 
protagonist to gain autonomy (‘Marlen’ 186). It also allows animals more freedom, sparing 
the bullock Stier from the slaughterhouse, for example (Haushofer, Die Wand 133), and leads 
to a new kind of relationship between them and the narrator. I will argue here that, in her 
critique of patriarchy and its oppression of women, in her sympathy for and reevaluation of 
                                                          
1 See https://www.geschichtewiki.wien.gv.at/Wiener_Tierschutzverein, last accessed 
09/01/2019. 
2 Thanks to Martin Balluch, chairperson of the Verein gegen Tierfabriken for information 
about the history of the Austrian animal welfare movement.  
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the status of non-human animals, and in her linking of these two areas of concern, Haushofer 
anticipates feminist, ecofeminist and pro-animal writings of the 1970s and beyond, 
particularly the idea of a feminist ethic of care. Before turning to Die Wand in detail, I want 
to outline some important developments in these fields, including discussions of the role of 
literature in animal advocacy, to provide a retrospective framework for my reading of 
Haushofer’s ground-breaking novel.  
Women have been centrally involved in animal advocacy from the European and 
North American animal welfare organizations of the nineteenth century to the modern animal 
liberation movement,3 and they have often made explicit links between feminism and animal 
rights.4 Simone de Beauvoir, whose Le deuxième sexe (1949, The Second Sex) was an 
important influence on Haushofer’s writing (Lorenz, ‘Marlen’), associated hunting, fishing 
and warfare with a male drive to dominate the natural world (de Beauvoir 95, 105). In the 
early 1960s, when Haushofer was writing Die Wand, there was growing protest against the 
effects of man-made technology and farming methods on the environment and on animals in 
writings that typically originated in the United States or in the United Kingdom, but were 
sometimes translated into German. In Silent Spring (1962), published in German in 1963 as 
Der stumme Frühling and often considered the foundational text of the environmental 
movement, Rachel Carson exposed the wide-ranging deleterious consequences of pesticide 
use and other practices that illustrated man’s ‘arrogant’ attempts to ‘control nature’ (258). 
Though she does not discuss the relationship between gender and the abuse of animals 
directly, she does refer to perpertrators as ‘men’. In a letter written in 1953, for example, she 
                                                          
3 See Lorenz, ‘Austrian Women’, on women’s animal advocacy around 1900 (70). 
4 See Donovan, ‘Animal rights’ (359), for examples of first-wave feminists who advocated 
for animals. See also Richards. 
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criticizes the conservationist Aldo Leopold, calling him ‘a completely brutal man’ (327) who 
hunts and ‘tortures’ animals (328), and expresses regret that ‘so much of [conservation] is in 
the hands of men who smugly assume that the end of conservation is to provide fodder for 
their guns—and that anyone who feels otherwise is a sentimental fool’ (328). In 1964, Ruth 
Harrison published Animal Machines, a powerful, but not explicitly feminist, critique of 
factory farming, translated into German as Tiermaschinen in 1965. It inspired farm-animal 
welfare reform in Europe and, according to ethologist Marian Stamp Dawkins, brought a 
change in the way people thought about animals ‘around the world’ (1-2).  
In the 1970s, 80s and 90s, feminists developed these critiques of male ‘progress’ and 
associated animal abuse into a comprehensive theory of intersectional patriarchal oppression, 
arguing that for centuries, men have been identified with science, rationalism, and culture, 
while women have been aligned with the opposite, ‘lesser’ values—with emotion, the body 
and the ‘natural’ world—in a binary system. Ecofeminism in particular exposed the 
connections between sexism, colonialism, racism, speciesism and the environment, and 
demonstrated that the construction of normative masculinity in Western society is dependent 
on separation from and domination over the maternal, the feminine, and ‘others’ associated 
with them, including animals (Donovan, ‘Animal rights’ 367-69). For Andrée Collard in 
Rape of the Wild (1988), man’s first hunting expeditions are patriarchy’s founding moment, 
because they legitimized male brutality and led to a gendered division of labor (38). Hunting 
continues to be ‘the modus operandi of patriarchal societies on all levels of life’ (34), 
societies driven by ‘death-oriented values’ (2), in which man asserts power over women, 
animals, and nature to ward off feelings of fear and fragmentation (47), and hunts not because 
he loves nature but because he loves ‘how he feels in it as he stalks his prey’ (5). So 
accustomed are we to predation, Collard writes, ‘that it horrifies only when it threatens to kill 
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us all, as in the case of nuclear weapons’ (46).5 In The Sexual Politics of Meat (1990), Carol 
J. Adams addresses the long-standing association between meat and masculinity from another 
angle. As animals are abused, slaughtered and consumed, she argues, so women in patriarchal 
society are abused and objectified—‘consumed’ in sexual terms—, for example in 
pornography. Animal abuse is obscured because animals are often ‘absent referents’ in 
language, such as when we refer to their dead bodies as ‘meat’ (92). Another point of 
connection between the oppression of women and animals, according to Adams, is the 
control and abuse of their reproductive capacities. Cows and hens are exploited for their milk 
and eggs as well as their offspring in the agriculture industry (103, 112). 
 Animal ecofeminists challenged the masculine bias of the animal rights philosophy 
developed in the 1970s and 1980s by Peter Singer, Tom Regan, and others. In Animal 
Liberation (1975), Singer argues from a utilitarian position that, because non-human animals 
are capable of feeling pleasure and pain, their interests should be respected, and that the 
boundary between animals and human beings is arbitrary. In The Case for Animal Rights 
(1983), Regan insists that, although animals do not share human rationality, they have rights 
because they are ‘subjects-of-a-life’. For Josephine Donovan, Singer’s utilitarianism, which 
involves ranking the suffering of different sentient creatures, ‘remains locked in a rationalist, 
calculative mode of moral reasoning’ which in fact reinforces the gap between human and 
non-human animals (‘Animal rights’ 358). As for Regan, his natural rights theory privileges a 
particular kind of creature with ‘a subjective consciousness […] and/or […] the kind of 
complex awareness found in adult mammals’ (355). Rather than asserting an abstract concept 
of rights, which relies on autonomy, equality and justice, or adopting the ‘masculinist’, holist 
ecological view that nature as a whole is the locus of value rather than its individual parts 
                                                          
5 See also Marti Kheel , ‘A License to Kill’, on masculinity and hunting. 
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(Kheel, ‘A License to Kill’ 97), pro-animal feminists such as Donovan promoted a ethics of 
care, which privileged attachment, compassion, and responsibility. According to this moral 
system, which Carol Gilligan first discussed in In A Different Voice (1982) and which other 
feminist thinkers developed further in the 1980s and 1990s, ethical decisions are an embodied 
response, an ‘interplay between emotion and cognitive skills’ (Curtin 278), growing out of 
particular relationships with others and involving an understanding of context and narrative 
rather than being dependent on universalizable rules. Pro-animal feminists argue that the 
‘others’ owed a duty of care include non-human animals, with whom we share an experience 
of physical life in the world and a certain relatedness. Following in the tradition of Iris 
Murdoch and Simone Weil’s ethics of moral attention to others, they argue that we should 
paid careful heed to individual animals and to our instinctive, ‘visceral’ response to animal 
suffering and death (Gruen 290; Kheel, ‘Vegetarianism’ 335). As Donovan writes: 
 
Out of a women’s relational culture of caring and attentive love […] emerges the 
basis for a feminist ethic for the treatment of animals. We should not kill, eat, torture, 
and exploit animals because they do not want to be so treated, and we know that. If 
we listen, we can hear them (‘Animal rights’ 375). 
 
For Collard, maternity is at the heart of a care ethics approach to animals. She traces 
the link between women and nature to ancient goddess-worshipping civilizations, who 
believed in a ‘concept of universal kinship’ (3) between all creatures because they were all 
born of Mother Earth: ‘Creatures as diverse to us as the pig, the dolphin and the human child 
were perceived as uterine animals: animals born of the same mother, nourished at the same 
source, subject to the same laws’ (9). Women continue to have a special relationship with 
nature and non-human animals because of their reproductive system, which allows them ‘to 
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share the experience of bringing forth and nourishing life with the rest of the living world’ 
(106), but they do not actually need to bear a child to experience this particular connection.  
Ecofeminism had waned in popularity by around 2000 (Gaard, ‘Ecofeminism’). It was 
dismissed by many as too broad-ranging and as falsely equating different causes, or, as Erica 
Cudworth puts it, for ‘a tendency […] to conflation—the use of an all-encompassing theory 
of gender relations to explain intersected oppressions’ (26). The ‘pro-animal’ aspect of 
ecofeminism came under particular attack. Greta Gaard argues that many ecofeminists saw 
gender roles, and some saw species, as socially constructed (31-36), but comments such as 
Collard’s on motherhood exposed ecofeminism to the change of homogenizing women and of 
‘essentializing [them] as emotional and bodily and closer to nature than men’ (Gaard 193). In 
Woman the Hunter (1997), Mary Zeiss Stange argued that to oppose hunting on feminist 
grounds was to reinforce old stereotypes of women as peace-loving and passive, which 
amounted to ‘a flight from self-knowledge, as well as from responsibility’ (185). ‘Woman the 
Hunter,’ she asserts, ‘is a necessarily disruptive figure’ (2), who has a profound 
understanding of nature ‘as a process of life and death’ (84). Other critics insisted that 
regarding the welfare of animals as a feminist concern took attention away from women’s 
needs (Adams and Donovan 3), or that vegetarianism was not healthy for women (Paxton 
George). For some, it seemed to place another ‘moral burden’ on the shoulders of women, 
who bore an unequal share of caring responsibilities already.6 There were disagreements 
within ecofeminism, too. Some ecofeminists argued that it was ethnocentric to expect all 
ethnic groups, regardless of their culture, to forgo animal products (Sturgeon 154-55).  
If certain feminists have rejected the association with animal rights, some pro-animal 
writers have also rejected, or at least qualified, the analogy between animals’ and women’s 
                                                          
6 Paxton George 408. See also Gruen 284.  
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oppression. They point out that animals have much less scope for resistance than women 
(Hastedt 208), and that comparing women in the sex industry with farm animals minimizes 
the suffering of the latter, who, unlike women, are bred and killed by the millions (Heubach 
266). 
Despite opposition to linking the animal and feminist causes, the modern field of 
Critical Animal Studies bears a debt to and shows a continued overlap with feminism and 
ecofeminism (Gaard). Making a point similar to Collard’s, German sociologist Birgit 
Mütherich argued in 2005 that domination over animals is the archetypal mode of patriarchal 
oppression of all groups, including of women, and that both women and animals are prey in 
the ‘“unendlichen Jagdgebiet” des Mannes’ (man’s infinite hunting ground, 14, 23). A focus 
on the intersectionality of oppression is one of the ten principles set out by the Institute for 
Critical Animal Studies.7 Influenced by Derrida, postmodern and posthuman Critical Animal 
Studies also interrogates or deconstructs the boundary between the human and the animal 
which has long informed the Western philosophical tradition, an undertaking which, for 
feminists, has a gendered inflection. Since historically women have occupied the category 
‘human’ only tenuously, twenty-first-century feminists argue, the human subject to be 
decentred in the posthuman project is male. Rosi Braidotti writes: ‘Becoming animal, 
minoritarian […] speaks to my feminist self, partly because my sex, historically speaking, 
never made it into full humanity, so my allegiance to that category is at best negotiable and 
never to be taken for granted’ (531). The concepts of ‘woman’ and ‘animal’ are diffuse, 
homogenized constructions, imbued with those qualities the male subject seeks to control, 
disavow and separate off from the ‘male’ and the ‘human’ respectively (Mütherich 9, 21; see 
also Hastedt 205-6). For Susan Fraiman, as for Donovan, this process is at work in those male 
                                                          
7 See http://www.criticalanimalstudies.org/about/ last accessed 18/01/2019. 
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writers on animals who reject ‘feminizing associations’ by asserting their neutrality and 
objectivity (Fraiman 100). Feminist animal writers, Fraiman suggests, including those with 
widely differing theoretical positions such as Adams and Donna Haraway, are more likely 
than their male counterparts to attest to, and draw on, their affection for animals. In a recent 
volume published by the German Human-Animal Studies research group Chimaira, Sabine 
Hastedt adds her voice to the ‘deconstructive-feminist’ critique of the binary concepts 
‘man/woman’ and ‘human/animal’. With reference to Judith Butler, she argues that animals 
are not passive, fixed, unchangeable entities, but ‘actors’ in the realm of culture, capable of 
development, and able to ‘perform’ in their relationships with human beings in ways that 
challenge stereotypes. 
 Spanning the period from the late 1970s to the 2000s, the animal essays of ethics 
philosopher Cora Diamond touch on many of these questions. Diamond’s discussion of the 
role of literature in advocating for animals makes her work particularly illuminating for a 
discussion of Haushofer’s Die Wand. Diamond only briefly addresses the intersection 
between sexism and animal abuse. In the 1978 essay ‘Eating Meat and Eating People’, she 
accepts that there are links between speciesism and sexism, and that ‘What might be called 
the dark side of human solidarity has analogies with the dark side of sexual solidarity’ (466, 
478-9), but she argues that these analogies are weaker than some have suggested. Diamond 
takes issue with Singer’s argument that we should not eat animals for the same reasons we do 
not eat people. In her view, we do not refrain from eating people because—or only because—
we recognize them as beings with quantifiable interests, in the way that Singer asks us to do 
for animals, but rather because there is something specific, and special, about our relationship 
to other human beings. This is evidenced by the fact that we do not eat deceased people, even 
if their deaths were accidental, and treat their corpses with respect, although a corpse has no 
awareness and therefore no ‘interests’.  
 
 
10 
 
Diamond does advocate for a more sympathetic treatment of animals, however, with 
arguments in many ways in keeping with an ethics of care. The way to promote 
vegetarianism, she argues in the 2001 essay ‘Injustice and Animals’, is not to encourage 
human beings to see animals as the same as us, but to acknowledge that even though they are 
different from us--‘strange and other’ as she puts it (140)--they are still ‘“with” us’ in the 
world (139). To counteract injustice, she believes in the importance of an embodied, 
emotional response to the suffering of animals, whom she describes in her 1978 essay as 
‘fellows in mortality, in life on this earth […] in a certain boat’ with us’ (‘Eating’ 474). 
Rather than calculating their interests and rights in an abstract way, we should exercise ‘a 
kind of loving attention’ (‘Injustice’ 131-32), which would lead us to recognize their 
vulnerability, to feel distress at their pain, and to respond with pity or to ‘relent’ in our 
treatment of them (‘Eating’ 478). As shown above, Donovan believes that if we listen, we can 
‘hear’ animals. Diamond would agree, but she argues that when we ‘hear’ a moral appeal 
from an animal or see in its eyes an appeal for pity, we are projecting a human response on to 
it, ‘hearing it speak—as it were—the language of our fellow human beings’ (‘Eating’ 478). 
Rather than rejecting our special human status, we need to draw on it to enable us to make 
moral judgments, since without it, we have ‘no footing left from which to tell us what we 
ought to do’ (‘Eating’ 478). 
In another essay, ‘The Difficulty of Reality and the Difficulty of Philosophy’ (2003), 
Diamond addresses the limitations of philosophy, which ‘deflects’ our exposure to the reality 
of animals’ suffering by means of rational, moral arguments (59). Literature can go further: 
calling on the imagination, it can at moments ‘expose’ us to the horror and beauty of animals’ 
lives, to our shared bodily vulnerability, and to the pain we cause them, which typically resist 
our modes of thinking and are ‘capable of panicking us’ (‘Difficulty’ 74). Diamond discusses 
how the protagonist of J. M. Coetzee’s lecture-novel The Lives of Animals (1999), Elizabeth 
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Costello, experiences her awareness of the suffering human beings inflict on animals, and the 
fact that most people carry on as if oblivious of it, as an isolating and almost unbearable 
wound. In Haushofer’s Die Wand, I will argue, the protagonist is similarly exposed to 
realities of death and human destruction which her mind struggles to comprehend. To use 
Diamond’s words, ‘the livingness and death of animals’ are portrayed as ‘presences that may 
unseat our reason’ (‘Difficulty’ 74) in Haushofer’s novel. 
 
Marlen Haushofer, Die Wand 
Haushofer was not, as far as we know, involved in any pro-animal organization. Nor was she 
a vegetarian, although her biographer Daniela Strigl writes that she did not enjoy cooking 
meals for her family, meals which would presumably have typically included meat, and that, 
like the protagonist of her novel Die Mansarde (The Loft, 1969), she may have preferred to 
eat bread and butter if left to her own devices (Strigl, Marlen 190). She was afraid of dogs, 
and despite a childhood spent in the Alpine countryside, where her father was a forester, 
preferred living in the city (Strigl 249). She was however highly sensitive to animal suffering. 
She refused to go fishing with her husband because of her concern for the fish (273), and she 
was deeply upset when living in Steyr by the slaughter of pigs and cows in the butcher’s yard 
outside her flat (240-41). She was particularly fond of cats (290), referring to one of her pet 
cats as a third child (222), even took cat food with her to feed stray ones when she went on 
holiday to Rome (Studer 50).  
Animals appear in some form in many of Haushofer’s novels and stories. In the 
autobiographical Himmel, der nirgendwo endet (Never-Ending Sky, 1966), the child 
protagonist Meta, Haushofer’s self-portrait (Strigl, Marlen 19), adores the family dog, is 
horrified when her father beats him, and is afraid that she will be next (Himmel 130). Meta’s 
distress at the killing of pigs and deer destroys her faith in God (Strigl, Marlen 73-75). In Die 
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Mansarde, the narrator’s quest in life is to draw a bird which, as she puts it, does not look like 
it is alone in the world (21). Two of Haushofer’s children’s books, Müssen Tiere draußen 
bleiben? (1967, Do Animals Have to Stay Outside?) and Wohin mit dem Dackel? (1968, 
Where To Put The Dachshund?), tell of children’s fondness for dogs, while a third, Bartls 
Abenteuer (1964, Bartl’s Adventure), is narrated from a cat’s perspective. It is in Die Wand, 
however, that her attention to the point of view of non-human animals is at its most radical. 
 As is often the case with animals in literature, critics have typically read the non-
human characters in Die Wand in figurative ways, as saying something about humanity. 
Gerhard Knapp argues that the ‘near-ideal relationship’ between the protagonist and Luchs 
the dog, who is male, shows that ‘the novel does not close the book forever on any future 
possibility of human co-existence and even (hetero)sexual love’ (304), because Luchs 
represents a kind of ‘new’ masculinity (303) and acts as ‘a substitute husband’ (299). For 
Wolfgang Bunzel, portraying animals allows Haushofer to explore, by way of contrast, what 
it means to be human (104-5). Elke Brüns interprets the animals psychoanalytically, as 
revelatory of the narrator’s psyche. More recently however some critics have understood the 
animals on their own terms. Sabine Frost compares the novel Die Wand with the film version, 
released in 2012. She argues that in the film the protagonist achieves complete oneness with 
nature and animals, but that in the novel this ‘utopian project […] fails’ (62). According to 
Frost, ‘[the narrator’s] care for the animals is but another kind of power relation’ (69), and 
she only has empathy for those to whom she can attribute human qualities. Vanessa Hester 
observes that the narrator of Die Wand questions the boundary between humans and animals, 
which, though remaining, reveals itself to be more fluid than the narrator had supposed. 
 
 
13 
 
While scholarly attention to the animals as animals has been the exception, the 
novel’s feminist message has been widely recognized.8 In this article I want to link these two 
perspectives and illustrate how Haushofer anticipates future feminist thinking on animals. 
The re-evaluation of the status of animals, I will argue, is the result of the narrator’s close, 
embodied relationship with them and has a clearly feminist inflection. Foreshadowing a care 
ethics approach, her portrayal of animals and of her protagonist’s maternal role towards them 
dismantles certain stereotypes, while relying on others. 
Die Wand was written at the height of the Cold War, after the Berlin Wall had been 
erected and a neutron bomb invented which could destroy life while leaving property intact 
(Knapp 286), and Haushofer has her narrator assume that the wall which descends overnight 
is a weapon. The world petrified behind it, according to the narrator, was a patriarchal one, 
hostile, strange, and unsettling to women (61). In fact it resembled a ‘Kongress der 
Autofabrikanten’ (166) (‘a motorcar manufacturers’ congress’, 170),9 an image 
characterizing Austria in the post-war years as a capitalist, technologically-oriented society 
dominated by groups of privileged men, of which the car, like the Mercedes left useless 
inside the wall until it is claimed by nature, is a symbol. The narrator is relieved that no men 
seem to have survived, because, being physically stronger, they would have been able to 
order her around (48). She abandons most stereotypically ‘feminine’ attributes, including a 
concern for her appearance, and engages in hard, physical labor more typical of men’s work, 
but, as Jacqueline Vansant observes, ‘two human qualities remain constant before and after 
the wall: woman’s role as protector of life and man’s as destroyer’ (66). Destructiveness, 
                                                          
8 For feminist readings of Die Wand see e.g. Lorenz, ‘Marlen Haushofer’; Vansant; Frei 
Gerlach; Knapp; Venske. 
9 English translations of Die Wand are from Haushofer, The Wall, trans. Whiteside.  
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aggression, and domination over others are connoted male and shown to be part of the 
‘hunting’, death-driven ideology which, according to Collard, is central to the workings of 
patriarchy, but which only horrifies us when it takes an extreme form, such as in the 
construction of weapons. Love and caring are female. The gendered nature of these qualities 
is underlined when the protagonist identifies two groups: people ‘von meiner Art’, who care 
for others, create life and bring up children, and ‘die Anderen’, who are motivated to destroy 
others by jealousy at the reproductive capacity: 
 
Wären alle Menschen von meiner Art gewesen, hätte es nie eine Wand gegeben 
[…]. Aber ich verstehe, warum die Anderen immer in der Übermacht waren. 
Lieben und für ein anderes Wesen sorgen ist ein sehr mühsames Geschäft und 
viel schwerer, als zu töten und zu zerstören. Ein Kind aufzuziehen dauert 
zwanzig Jahre, es zu töten zehn Sekunden […] vielleicht bin ich jetzt so weit, 
dass ich auch die Mörder verstehen kann. Ihr Hass auf alles, was neues Leben 
erschaffen kann, muss ungeheuer sein. (121-122) 
 
(If everyone had been like me there would never have been a wall […]. But I 
understand why the others always had the upper hand. Loving and looking after 
another creature is a very troublesome business, and much harder than killing 
and destruction. It takes twenty years to bring up a child, and then seconds to 
kill it […] perhaps I’ve reached the point where I can understand even 
murderers. Their hate for everything capable of creating new life must be 
terrible. 124) 
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The novel as a whole is an illustration of the idea, expressed emphatically here, that caring is 
not merely an emotion, but a series of repeated, often long-term actions, which constitute 
hard work. As for Collard, for the narrator the propensity to care in this way is rooted in a 
maternity which extends beyond human offspring. Later in the novel she dreams of 
interspecies reproduction, with herself a kind of universal mother to a family of creatures, 
recalling Collard’s vision of nature’s diverse ‘uterine animals’: 
 
Wir sind von einer einzigen großen Familie, und wenn wir einsam und unglücklich 
sind, nehmen wir auch die Freundschaft unserer entfernten Vettern gern entgegen [...] 
Im Traum bringe ich Kinder zur Welt, und es sind nicht nur Menschenkinder, es gibt 
unter ihnen Katzen, Hunde, Kälber, Bären und ganz fremdartige pelzige Geschöpfe. 
(177) 
 
(We belong to a single great family, and if we are lonely and unhappy we gladly 
accept the friendship of our distant relations […] In my dreams I bring children into 
the world, and they aren’t only human children; there are cats among them, dogs, 
calves, bears and quite peculiar furry creatures. 180) 
 
Scholars have shown that, following de Beauvoir, Haushofer’s fiction reveals gender 
differences to be in large part a social construct (Lorenz, ‘Marlen’ 177-78). Founded as it is 
in maternity, however, the gendering of caring is presented as natural in Die Wand. 
Elsewhere the narrator describes the instinct to care for others as ‘eingepflanzt’, which 
similarly suggests an inborn quality (55, 151). Brüns sees this naturalization of women’s love 
for animals as problematic (59-60) and Mireille Tabah similarly points out that, although she 
rejects patriarchy, the narrator reproduces the caring role it ascribes to women (189). In 
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linking the two, however, Haushofer anticipates the ecofeminists of the 1970s and beyond for 
whom maternal care is an empowering source of moral value. It is worth noting, though, that 
in Die Wand women are not necessarily motherly and caring. The narrator’s cousin Luise, 
described briefly at the beginning in the novel is an enthusiastic hunter; her husband Hugo is 
more peaceful. 
The narrator has always liked animals (112), but the wall precipitates a major shift in 
her relationship with them. Suddenly facing a struggle for survival, she recognizes the 
physical vulnerability she shares with them, that they are ‘fellows in mortality’ (Diamond 
‘Eating’ 474). The members of this ‘einzigen grossen Familie’ all suffer pain and need food, 
warmth and tenderness (177). She and the cat, she writes, are made of the same stuff and 
‘saßen im gleichen Boot, das mit allem, was da lebte, auf die großen dunklen Fälle zutrieb’  
(151) (‘were in the same boat, drifting with all living things towards the great dark rapids’, 
155), a comment which recalls Diamond’s description of non-human animals as ‘in the same 
boat’ as human beings. When the deer are starving in the winter, then, the narrator shares her 
chestnuts with them, even though she needs them herself (104). It is those animals who 
become part of her immediate ‘family’ however who especially cause her to re-evaluate 
conventional concepts of the human and the animal and the barriers between them. She is 
mutually dependent on Luchs the dog, the Cat and her kittens Tiger and Perle (Pearl), Bella 
the cow and her calf Stier (Bullock). They share daily experiences—responses to the weather, 
for example (174), or, in the case of the Cat and of Bella, whom she describes as a sister 
(176), the experience of labor and motherhood. She, Luchs, and the cats share meals like a 
family, and the Cat shares her bed. They offer her the ‘friendship’ she refers to in the 
quotation above, and she becomes more attached to them than she was to people, who never 
seemed friendly to her (112) and are harder to love than animals (93). Even her daughters are 
described in negative terms (28), while her animal family have mainly positive attributes. 
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Luchs is loyal, brave, and cheerful; Bella is gentle, patient, and a loving mother; Stier is 
innocent and trusting; the Cat is clever and independent; Perle is beautiful and peaceful; Tiger 
is affectionate and playful.10 They possess types of intelligence that the narrator does not, 
including an instinctual understanding of the moods of others and a knowledge of the forest. 
Von der Thüsen finds the way she writes about the animals and her relationship with them 
sentimental and moralizing (164). In this he echoes the masculinist dismissal of affection for 
animals identified by Donovan and others and ignores the political aspect of the novel’s 
‘moralizing’. 
As time goes on, the narrator feels the boundaries between her and her animal family 
begin to dissolve (177). This is particularly the case with Luchs. During one summer she 
completely forgets, ‘dass Luchs ein Hund war und ich ein Mensch. Ich wusste es, aber es 
hatte jede trennende Bedeutung verloren’ (200) (‘that Lynx was a dog and I was a human 
being. I knew it, but it had lost any distinctive meaning’, 203). When he dies, she mourns him 
                                                          
10 According to Bunzel, assigning arbitrary names to animals is an exercise of human power. 
In Die Wand, many of the animals are instead named after their species or metonymically, 
that is, according to their characteristics (Bunzel, 115). The cat Tiger’s name could also 
suggest a blurring of species boundaries. In the case of Luchs (Lynx), however, the narrator 
suggests something different. She writes that his name, ‘ganz unpassend’(27) (quite 
unsuitable, 31) to him, is a name long given to hunting dogs in the valley, one of whom may 
long ago have been responsible for killing the last lynx, a species now hunted to extinction 
there (31). His name is another sad reminder, then, of the human destruction of animals. The 
narrator herself remains nameless, since there is no human being left to use the name 
arbitrarily assigned to her. 
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profoundly (111-112) and begins writing the report in an attempt to maintain her sanity in the 
face of grief.  As discussed above, feminist critics such as Braidotti have argued that a loose 
grip on the boundary between the human and the animal such as this comes more easily to 
women, whose position in society’s hierarchy of creatures is not as privileged as men’s. Like 
Braidotti’s, it seems that the narrator‘s ‘allegiance’ to a fixed category of the human ‘is at 
best negotiable’. 
What are the narrative implications of Die Wand’s focus on non-human characters? 
The novel is a genre which typically relies on dialogue, relationships and conflicts between 
people, but for most of Die Wand the narrator is the only human being present. There is very 
little direct speech, a strong focus on her own experiences, described by Celia Torke as an 
‘Ich-Fixierung’ (ego-fixation, 211), and little ‘action’. It is largely an account of the 
narrator’s day-to-day work in the changing seasons, planting, growing, scything, and caring 
for the animals, interspersed with reflections on her situation. To some extent however the 
non-human animals can fulfil the narrative roles typically occupied by human characters 
because of the dynamic and individualized way they are portrayed. They have agency, or, at 
least, as much agency as anyone: the narrator challenges the idea that any living creature has 
‘free will’, thus eroding another distinction historically drawn between human and non-
human animals.11 They do not all adhere to some vague, diffuse idea of the ‘animal’ of the 
kind criticized by pro-animal feminists such as Mütherich or embody a static, passive concept 
of nature of the kind identified by Hastedt. Instead the narrator observes differences between 
animals of the same and of different species, and within individual creatures over time. When 
                                                          
11 See The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, https://www.iep.utm.edu/anim-eth/#H1, last 
accessed 09.07.2019, for the views of Aristotle, amongst other philosophers, on animals’ 
instinctive behaviour versus human free will. 
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the cat gives birth to kittens, the narrator soon becomes aware of their ‘eigensinnigen kleinen 
Seelen’ (54) (‘independent little souls’ 57), observing that ‘nicht einmal zwei junge Katzen 
gleichen einander aufs Haar’ (54) (‘not even two young cats are as alike as peas in a pod’, 
57). She describes Tiger’s games in loving detail and in doing so attributes to him abilities 
commonly associated only with human beings: the ability to invent and communicate rules, 
perform, and pretend. His passion, she writes, is theatre, and he plays a number of different 
roles (144, see also 130, 154-55). Luchs, as well as the narrator, is called upon to join in the 
kitten’s games. The narrator describes his response to Tiger in a nuanced way that suggests a 
complex interior life, a change in feelings over time, the freedom to direct his own behavior, 
and a desire to communicate with others: 
  
Luchs war längst nicht mehr eifersüchtig. Ich glaube, er nahm Tiger nicht ernst. Er 
spielte wohl manchmal mit ihm, das heißt, er ging gutmütig auf die Spiele des 
Kleinen ein, aber er scheute seine Temperamentsausbrüche. Wenn Tiger einen 
seiner Anfälle erlitt und durch die Hütte tobte, sah Luchs mich mit dem Blick eines 
ratlosen Erwachsenen an, leicht irritiert und ohne Verständnis. (145) 
 
(Lynx had long ceased to be jealous. I don’t think he took Tiger seriously. He did 
sometimes play with him, he would devote himself to the little one’s games, but he 
was afraid of his temper tantrums. Whenever Tiger had one of his temper tantrums 
and raged through the hut, Lynx looked at me with the expression of a helpless, 
slightly irritated and uncomprehending adult. 147) 
  
From passages such as this one, which casts Luchs as an exasperated stepfather, it is 
easy to see why Haushofer has been accused of anthropomorphizing the animals (von der 
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Thüsen 162; Frost 70-71). As animal theorists have argued however, anthropomorphism does 
not have to be aligned with anthropocentrism and has the potential to expand our 
understanding of animals. The criticism inherent in the term may rely on a false belief that 
animals are more different from us than they really are (Ryan 39, 41). In describing animals 
in seemingly ‘human’ terms, the narrator of Die Wand is acknowledging the ways in which 
they are, to use Diamond’s words, ‘So like us […] so astonishingly capable of being 
companions of ours’ (‘Difficulty’ 61)—the way that kittens play just as human children do, 
for example. At the same time she accepts that in other respects they are ‘so unlike us […], so 
unfathomably distant’ (Diamond, ‘Difficulty’ 61). On one occasion she imagines, for 
example, which memories may enter Bella’s mind, but concludes ‘Ich weiß so wenig von ihr’ 
(78) (‘I know so little about her’, 81). Tentative in her descriptions and interpretations of the 
animals’ motives and behavior, she repeatedly uses the verb ‘scheinen’ (to seem) and 
expressions, as in the above quotation, such as ‘Ich glaube’ (I think), ‘Ich weiß nicht, ob’ (I 
don’t know if), ‘ich kann mir vorstellen’ (I can imagine), ‘vielleicht’ (perhaps), ‘Ich wundere 
mich darüber, wie’ (I wonder how), and ‘als ob’ (as if). Of Luchs’s ability to understand her 
speech, she writes: ‘Wer weiß, vielleicht verstand er auch schon mehr Wörter, als ich dachte’ 
(199-200) (‘Who knows, perhaps he understood more than I thought’, 203). Faced with the 
unknowability of animals, instead of giving up any attempt to understand them, she offers 
speculative possibilities.12 In fact, Haushofer’s observations often appear well-founded. 
                                                          
12 Ryan discusses the use of ‘as if’ as a way of offering tentative interpretations of animal 
motives in Angela Carter’s short story ‘Lizzie’s Tiger’ (Animal Theory, 41-47). 
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Before writing the novel she studied animal behavior carefully.13 The author Oskar Jan 
Tauschinski described her portrayal of animals in the novel as ‘genialisiche Offenbarung’ 
(brilliant revelation), worthy of publication in a zoology journal (25). Recent research has 
supported many of her speculations, suggesting for example that dogs may understand more 
of human language than has previously been supposed (Prichard et al). 
 Perhaps surprisingly, however, in view of the proximity between the human narrator 
and her animal family, the novel appears ultimately to uphold the idea of an unbridgeable 
barrier between human beings and other species. The narrator realises that she is unable ever 
to ‘become animal’: ‘ein Mensch kann niemals ein Tier werden, er stürzt am Tier vorüber in 
einen Abgrund’ (31) (‘a human being can never become just an animal; he plunges beyond, 
into the abyss’, 35). Were she to cease such daily activities as washing her clothes, she fears 
she would become a depraved human being, rather than a non-human animal in harmony 
with nature (31). Furthermore, she remains in charge of the animals, the head of the family. 
Like the female animals whose reproductive capacity, as Adams observes, is exploited in 
agriculture, so Bella is used by the narrator for milk. Hofman calls this an instrumentalization 
of Bella (203), but this characterization ignores the context in which it takes place. Bella does 
not apparently suffer from it, her calf is not deprived, and her provision of milk for the others 
takes place within a loving familial network of mutual dependence: she, like the narrator, is a 
kind of mother figure for them. More problematically, the narrator kills fish and deer for 
food. Her hunting is very different, however, from the feminist act of self-assertion that Zeiss 
Stange describes. As Collard points out, people who hunt for pleasure ‘kill the biggest and 
                                                          
13 Haushofer checked her facts about animals and plants very carefully as she wrote the novel 
and asked her brother Rudolf, who had studied forestry, for information (Strigl, Marlen 249-
50). 
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the best’ (52), while animals such as bears kill the weak. For the narrator of Die Wand as for 
non-human animals, hunting is a necessity, not a means to fortify the ego. She only shoots 
weak bucks, hoping thereby to stop the deer from reproducing so quickly and suffering a food 
shortage themselves (75-76). Far from bringing her closer to nature, it is when engaged in 
what she calls ‘das blutige Geschäft der Jagd’ (45) (‘the bloody business of hunting’, 49) that 
she feels most at odds with her environment. Vestiges, at most, remain of hunting in the form 
it took before the wall. References to Luise’s enthusiasm for hunting and to the deceased 
huntsman are echoes of another time, the word ‘Jagdhütte’ (hunting lodge) to describe the 
narrator’s dwelling an anachronism. Hester argues that the narrator’s decision to kill to feed 
her family shows that she does not consider all species equal (207), but in fact this privileging 
of some animals is the contextual result of their relationship with and her responsibility for 
them, particularly for those unable to look after themselves because of previous human 
intervention, rather than due to any absolute moral distinction. Nevertheless, if hunting, as 
Collard argues, is ‘the modus operandi’ of patriarchy, which in Haushofer’s novel has found 
extreme expression in the weapon which is the invisible wall, it is no wonder that the narrator 
considers fishing murder (31) and retains her antipathy towards killing animals (39, 92). 
Despite this internal conflict, for the narrator as for Diamond it remains from the 
place of the human that sympathetic judgements about animals can be made and compassion 
extended to them. The narrator realizes it is imperative that she maintain her human reason 
(3) in order to be able to care, not only for herself, but also for her animal family (47). From 
her more powerful position as human being, she is able to exercise a kind of ‘mercy’ which 
seems similar to Diamond’s concept of ‘pity’ or ‘relenting’ in our dealings with animals. One 
winter’s day she sees a fox who, she conjectures, could be the one who killed Perle. She 
considers, but decides against, shooting it, because to do so would be to partake in the chain 
of ‘injustice’ which included Perle’s piscine victims as well as Perle herself (98). As a human 
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being, she alone has the burden of making ‘moral’ choices: she is ‘das einzige Wesen im 
Wald, das wirklich recht ohne unrecht tun kann, […]  Und nur ich kann Gnade üben’ (95) 
(‘the only creature in the forest that can really do right or wrong […] And I alone can show 
mercy’, 98). Diamond’s argument that we project human responses onto animals, 
‘imaginatively reading into animals something like an appeal to our pity’ or hearing them 
speak our language (‘Eating’ 478), is illustrated by the experience of giving birth which Bella 
and the narrator share across species boundaries, but which the narrator relies on human 
language to convey. When Bella goes into labor, she comforts her: ‘ich erzählte […] ihr alles, 
was die Hebamme mir in der Klinik gesagt hatte’ (106) (‘I said the same things to her that the 
midwife in the clinic had said to me’, 109). Bella may not know the meaning of the words, 
but the narrator believes that she understands the benevolent intention in them (106). To use a 
phrase of Diamond’s, her projection of human emotions onto animals is not ‘sentimental 
anthropomorphizing’ (‘Eating’ 472) , but a moral decision to treat animals as if they shared 
human responses, while recognizing the limitations of human understanding. 
 Die Wand exceeds the ‘realistic’ in order to expand conventional thinking about 
animals. In fantasy scenarios, animals prevail. The narrator dreams of talking animals (112) 
as well as interspecies reproduction. In an old magazine she finds a fantastical story of animal 
retribution in which the eel king chases and strangles a farmer who has tortured animals (96). 
She finds the story excellent. The science fiction, or perhaps fairy-tale,14 aspect of the novel 
                                                          
14 For Von der Thüsen, the novel resembles the kind of fairytale where a woman is banished 
to a tower or into the forest and becomes stronger as a result of her trials (166). Frei Gerlach 
similarly compares the narrator to the protagonists of legends who survive in the forest with 
the help of plants and animals (182). [See also for example Bettina von Arnim’s “Der 
Koenigssohn”)] 
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as a whole—the invisible wall—allows Haushofer to construct a world of changed relations 
to other creatures. It is striking, however, that the novel’s language, unlike its premise, is 
straightforward, often prosaic, and that the events narrated are largely the everyday tasks and 
repeated actions essential for the survival of the narrator and her family, the ‘mühsames 
Geschäft’ of looking after dependents that is traditionally carried out by women and 
dismissed under patriarchy as mundane. The narrator speculates very little on the wall and 
seems almost to forget it. Some critics past and present have judged the novel ‘boring’.15 
Frost finds it ‘monotonous’, with ‘tedious repetitions and lack of plot’ (63). For an early 
reviewer, the descriptions of the changing seasons were unnecessarily long.16 Von der Thüsen 
diagnoses a ‘Stilproblem’ (style problem) because Haushofer fails to invent new linguistic 
formulations for ideas (162, 164). Readers such as these seem to be missing a dimension of 
the text, appreciated by others whose reaction to it is diametrically opposed. Brüns writes of 
‘die immer wieder beschriebene soghafte Wirkung, die dieser Text auslöst’ (the effect of 
sucking you in which is often mentioned as emanating from this text), citing several critics 
and reviewers who describe themselves as entranced (‘gebannt’), compelled or absorbed by 
it, including one who is at first ‘besänftigt’ (soothed) by the language, ‘bis nach und nach 
Unbehagen in mir aufsteigt’ (until little by little a sense of unease arises in me) (Brüns 55, fn 
93, 264-65). Even von der Thüsen concedes that the novel possesses ‘die Strahlkraft des 
Unheimlichen’ (the radiant power of the uncanny, 170). This mesmerizing, fascinating 
quality is caused by the stylistic and thematic tension between the ordinary and the 
extraordinary discussed above, the juxtaposition of the quiet, limited language and world of 
                                                          
15 E.g. Franz Rainer Scheck in Science Fiction Times, May 1969, quoted in Brandtner and 
Kaukoreit, 58. 
16 Review by I. L., Die Presse (Wien), 29./30.8.1964, quoted in Brandtner and Kaukoreit, 62. 
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the novel on the one hand and a pervasive sense of threat on the other, described by Battiston-
Zuliani as ‘eine Kluft, eine Kontrastruktur zwischen der Ruhe des beschreibenden Tones und 
dem tatsächlich beschriebenen Grauen’ (a gulf, a structure of contrast between the quiet of 
the descriptive tone and the horror which is actually being described, 91). As Strigl points 
out, the narrator’s routine work loses any sense of ‘banality’ because it is a fight for survival 
(‘Vertreibung’, 135-36). That the wall is at once omnipresent—the title of and prerequisite 
for the story—and curiously absent clearly amounts more to a kind of repression than to 
forgetting, and the sense of something beyond, something terrifying to confront, remains.  
Influenced by the existentialist philosophy of the 1950s,17 the novel exposes the 
reader to ideas about the individual’s place within a vast, meaningless universe, into which 
animals and people are thrown (‘geworfen’ 179) without being consulted (‘ungefragt’, 179). 
Concepts such as these are seldom expressed clearly, difficult as they are to define or 
pinpoint, but they make themselves felt when the narrator is in awe, baffled, or traumatized, 
when her attempts at repression fail. In one passage worth quoting at length, Haushofer 
discusses ‘reality’ in terms similar to Diamond’s. Unable to understand the world, creatures 
can nevertheless authentically experience its beauty and its horror, while adult human beings 
typically avoid confronting them by means of daydreams and activities:   
  
Seit meiner Kindheit hatte ich es verlernt, die Dinge mit eigenen Augen zu sehen, 
und ich hatte vergessen, dass die Welt einmal jung, unberührt und sehr schön und 
schrecklich gewesen war. Ich konnte nicht mehr zurückfinden, ich war ja kein 
Kind mehr und nicht mehr fähig, zu erleben wie ein Kind, aber die Einsamkeit 
brachte mich dazu, für Augenblicke ohne Erinnerung und Bewusstsein noch 
                                                          
17 See Strigl, ‘Vertreibung’. 
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einmal den großen Glanz des Lebens zu sehen. Vielleicht leben die Tiere bis zu 
ihrem Tod in einer Welt des Schreckens und Entzückens. Sie können nicht fliehen 
und müssen die Wirklichkeit bis zu ihrem Ende ertragen. Selbst ihr Tod ist ohne 
Trost und Hoffnung, ein wirklicher Tod. Auch ich war, wie alle Menschen, immer 
auf der eiligen Flucht und immer in Tagträumen befangen. Weil ich den Tod 
meiner Kinder nicht gesehen hatte, bildete ich mir ein, sie wären noch am Leben. 
Aber ich sah, wie Luchs erschlagen wurde, ich sah das Hirn aus Stiers gespaltenem 
Schädel quellen, und ich sah, wie Perle sich wie ein Ding ohne Knochen 
dahinschleppte und verblutete, und immer wieder fühlte ich das warme Herz der 
Rehe in meinen Händen erkalten. 
Das war die Wirklichkeit. (158-59) 
  
(Since my childhood I had forgotten that the world had once been young and 
untouched and very beautiful and terrible. I couldn’t find my way back there, since 
I was no longer a child and no longer capable of experiencing things as a child but 
loneliness led me, in moments free of memory and consciousness, to see the great 
brilliance of life again. Perhaps animals spend their whole lives in a world of terror 
and delight. They cannot escape, and have to bear reality until they have ceased to 
be. Even their death is without solace and hope, a real death. Like all human 
beings, I too was forever in hurried flight; forever trapped in daydreams. Because I 
hadn’t seen the deaths of my children, I imagined them as being still alive. But I 
saw Lynx being killed, I saw the brain swell from Bull’s split skull, and I saw Pearl 
dragging herself along like a boneless thing and bleeding, and again and again I 
felt the warm heart of the deer cooling in my hands. 
That was reality. 162) 
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Animals and children, lacking the capacity to distract themselves from reality, ‘perhaps’ 
experience continually ‘a world of terror and delight’, but the narrator’s experience of it is 
intermittent. One summer spent on the Alm (high mountain pasture), for example, she gazes 
at the sky and loses herself in a sublime appreciation of nature (139). In moments such as 
these, the ‘lost world’ she describes seems almost prelapsarian, a sense reinforced in the long 
quotation above by biblical echoes.18 Nature, however, is far from a paradise. The narrator 
expresses a visceral sense of the terror of death. The repetition of ‘ich sah’ three times and the 
expression ‘immer wieder’ in the same sentence reinforce the involuntary, urgent way the 
images of animal death impress themselves upon her. Unlike for Heidegger, for whom 
animals’ lack of awareness of their impending death makes it less authentic, a mere 
‘verenden’ (coming to an end),19 for the narrator of Die Wand it is non-human animals, not 
human beings, who experience ‘a real death’, because they cannot detach themselves from it 
by means of the imagination. 
 In their introduction to What is Zoopoetics? (2018), Kári Driscoll and Eva Hoffmann 
argue that while it is a mistake to read animals in fiction ‘only or simply as metaphors’ (4) for 
something else, we should not be afraid to recognize their ‘literary and poetic character’, in 
other words, their potential symbolic significance . Although Haushofer’s literary exploration 
of an ethics of care involves recognizing and paying attention to animals as individuals, this 
does not preclude her employing them as symbols or synecdoches. The image of the 
beautiful, lonely fox who may have killed Perle, for example, repeatedly returns unbidden to 
her mind and represents, she believes, ‘etwas Wichtiges’ (95) (‘something important’, 98). 
                                                          
18 Cf. 1. Corinthians 13.11. 
19 See Heidegger, Unterwegs 203; Sein und Zeit, § 49, 247. 
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Exactly what this meaning is remains just out of reach (95), but it seems associated with the 
interdependency as well as the separateness of animals, and with the wonder and cruelty of 
nature, ideas which include, but exceed, the fox himself. This is true of the deer, too, to 
whose heart the narrator refers in the long quotation above. She finds the deer lying in the 
snow, its leg broken, kills it, and takes it home to eat. In Woman the Hunter, Zeiss Stange 
describes killing wild animals as an education in the dependence of life on death and the 
nature of existence (116). ‘There is an infinity of meaning’, she writes, ‘in the beating of a 
heart, as well as in its stopping’ (185). In Die Wand, the narrator’s experience of stopping a 
heart has something in common with Zeiss Stange’s description. Killing the deer sickens her 
and the memory of its heart, which is still warm when she cuts the ice-cold body open, 
remains with her, illustrative perhaps of the almost unfathomable transition from life to death. 
For a long time, she lies awake in the darkness ‘und dachte an das kleine Herz, das über mir 
in der Kammer zu einem Eisklumpen gefror’ (105) (‘thinking about the little heart freezing to 
a clump of ice in the room above me’, 108). For Haushofer as for Zeiss Stange, then, an 
animal’s death has existential weight. The conclusion she draws from the willed stopping of 
another’s heart, however, is very different. For Zeiss Stange it is something the hunter can 
observe impartially. Since life and death are ‘natural’ we should embrace killing and allow 
ourselves to be edified by its spectacle. Zeiss Stange argues that ecofeminists who criticize 
hunting as ‘masculine’ are absolving women of responsibility for the darker parts of 
themselves and of nature, associating women ‘only with the noble and life-affirming aspects 
of nonhuman nature’ (84). In fact, I would argue, Zeiss Stange absolves hunters of 
responsibility by casting killing as the ‘inevitable’ way of the world. In Die Wand, the 
stopping of the deer’s heart illustrates not only the harsh reality of life and death, but also 
human culpability. Its resonance is best understood in the context of other animal deaths—
that of the nuthatch she finds dead the day she discovers the wall, for example, its head caved 
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in after flying into the wall, whom she can never forget, ‘Aus irgendeinem Grund’ (11) (‘For 
some reason’, 15). The indelibility of these memories and the narrator’s inability to determine 
exactly what they signify point to an excess of ‘meaning’. They are suggestive of the 
profoundly unsettling, ‘unfathomable’ reality of death and of the human capacity for 
destruction.  
 This capacity finds an extreme manifestation at the end of the novel when a 
dishevelled man appears suddenly and kills Stier and Luchs by beating their skulls with an 
axe, before the narrator shoots him dead. Amongst other things her report is an attempt to 
understand the man’s apparently incomprehensible behavior (207). In the context of her love 
for her animal family and her disillusionment with humanity, in particular with men, the 
shock and incomprehension that readers have felt at her remorseless killing of the human 
intruder is surprising.20 As Knapp argues, he is representative of old masculinity (303). As 
such he is the remnant of a way of being the narrator wants to expunge. 
 Haushofer’s understanding of the relationship between the human and the animal 
differs, then, not only from Zeiss Stange’s, but also from Diamond’s. Like Diamond the 
narrator recognizes a boundary between human and non-human creatures that informs her 
moral position. But while for Diamond this moral difference, this ‘significance in human life’ 
(‘Eating’, 471), is valuable, Haushofer is more pessimistic about human beings. The feminist 
care ethic her narrator adopts in relation to animals, which is conceived of as an extension of 
maternal love and which involves a careful attention to individual creatures and their 
contexts, stands in contrast to the kind of ‘male’ violence which erupts in the final scene, but 
which has made itself felt in unsettling moments throughout her account and is the partially 
repressed premise for the novel as a whole. Nevertheless, she hunts with a weapon and 
                                                          
20 See e.g. Brandtner and Kaukoreit, eds, Marlen Haushofer. “Die Wand”, 70, 80, 105. 
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suspects that her ‘moral’ interventions on behalf of animals do no good (104, 138-9). As a 
human being, she remains an outsider (138), ‘die einzige Unruhe im Wald’ (116) (‘the only 
disturbance in the forest’, 119), and she believes that the forest does not want people to return 
(139). For Diamond, we bury fellow human beings, but not animals, with ceremony, and 
thereby underline the difference between them. By contrast, when the narrator of Die Wand 
kills a man, she does so without regret and pushes his corpse down the mountain, yet buries 
Luchs in one of his favourite spots and grieves deeply for him. If the human-animal hierarchy 
remains, it has been upturned. Even her report, this bulwark against the collapse of human 
reason, will, she predicts, ultimately be eaten by mice (62). Like the animal ecofeminists of 
the 1970s and beyond, the narrator of Die Wand inflects biophilia as female and feminist, but 
she shows that women are not immune from violence.21 Neither is nature portrayed as a 
utopia. What remains, despite her pessimism, is an almost existentialist belief in the value of 
perseverance and the ‘mühsames Geschäft’ of caring. Strigl sees the narrator of Die Wand as 
a kind of female Sisyphos, but writes that unlike Camus’s Sisyphos, she does not joyfully 
‘affirm’ life (125, 136) but accepts it with a kind of resignation (125). Hope is not entirely 
absent, however. At the end of the novel, she looks forward to the possibility that her female 
animal companions will give birth again. She will help care for their offspring, as she 
resolves to care for the single white crow in the spruce trees nearby, ostracized and left 
behind by its companions. The novel’s concluding line, in the present tense, expresses an 
                                                          
21 On women’s complicity in male sins in other works by Haushofer, see Venske, ‘“Dieses 
eine Ziel”’ and Kecht. 
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ongoing relationship between two individuals, woman and (female) animal, an expectation of 
care, and an assumption of responsibility: ‘Sie wartet schon auf mich’ (208).22  
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